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COMMENTS 
ALIENS - NATURALIZATION - NEUTRAL ALIENS WHO SOUGHT 
RELIEF FROM MILITARY SERVICE BARRED FROM BECOMING UNITED 
STATES CITIZENS-During World War II, an alien who was a citizen 
or a subject of a neutral country was allowed to escape service in the 
armed forces of the United States by signing Selective Service Form 
DSS 301. A release thus obtained carried with it a disability ever to 
become a citizen of the United States. A substantial number of neutral 
266 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 52 
aliens availed themselves of this relief from military service.1 Today, 
the courts are faced with the problem of whether signing Form 30 I 
shall in every case preyent the alien from becoming a citizen. It is 
the purpose of this comment to examine the cases that have arisen 
to date and to determine, against a background of United States policy 
in submitting aliens to military liability, the validity of the various 
defenses that have been interposed to the citizenship bar. 
I. History of Alien Liability to Military Service in the United 
States Through World War II . 
Before the Civil War, aliens were excluded from the armed forces 
of the United States, and this nation insisted that its citizens be free 
of military service abroad.2 This attitude found expression in a letter 
written by James Madison while he was secretary of state: 
"Citizens or subjects of one country residing in another, 
though bound by their temporary allegiance to many common 
duties, can never be rightfully forced into military service, par-
ticularly external service, nor be restrained from leaving their 
residence when they please. The law of nations protects them 
· b th "3 agamst o .... 
In 1862, Secretary of State Seward was able to write with assur-
ance: "I can hardly suppose that there exists, anywhere in the world, 
the erroneous belief that aliens are liable here to military duty."4 
A short time later, the Civil War Conscription Act5 became law, and 
aliens for the first time became liable to serve in the armed forces of 
the United States. This act distinguished aliens who had declared 
their intention to become citizens of the United States from non-
declarant aliens, imposing draft liability on the former class only. A 
short time later, because of protests from abroad, a presidential procla-
mation allowed declarant aliens to withdraw their declarations and 
escape service, provided they left the United States within sixty-five 
days and provided that they had not exercised political rights under 
1 Exact figures are not available, but the Selective Service System estimated that of 
the 4,000,000 aliens in the United States in 1940, 1,000,000 were liable to service, and 
of these four or five percent objected to entering the armed forces. See U.S. Government, 
Selective Service System, Special Monograph No. 16, 1 PROBLEMS oF SELECTIVE SERVICE 
99 (1952). 
2 Id. at 100. See also Fitzhugh and Hyde, "The Drafting of Neutral Aliens by the 
United States," 36 AM. J. Im:. L. 369 at 370 (1942). · 
3 4 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 52 (1906). 
4 Ibid. 
5 12 Stat. L. 731 (1863). 
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any state law.6 The Spanish American War Act7 also included mili-
tary liability for declarant aliens, but the ranks were entirely filled by 
volunteers and no problems were raised concerning alien service. 
The World War I Act of May 18, 1917,8 fixed the pattern of 
requiring service of declarant aliens, and once again an amended act 
provided an escape: 
"Provided, that a citizen or subject of a country neutral in the 
present war who has declared his intention to become a citizen 
of the United States shall be relieved from liability to military 
service upon his making a declaration, in accordance with such 
regulations as the President may prescribe, withdrawing his in-
tention to become a citizen of the United States, which shall 
operate and be held to cancel his declaration of intention to be-
come an American citizen and he shall forever be debarred from 
becoming a citizen of the United States."9 
Thus, the price of freedom from military service was permanent dis-
ability to become a citizen, although there was no longer a require-
ment that the alien leave the country. Bills which attempted to bar 
from citizenship nondeclarant aliens who claimed exemption from 
service on grounds of alienage failed to pass Congress.10 
The peacetime conscription law of 194011 followed the substance 
of these former acts closely. Registration was required of citizens 
and "every other male person residing in the United States," excepting 
diplomatic and consular officials. Only declarant aliens were liable 
for service. This act was amended by Public Law 360 after the 
United States entered World War II. Registration of aliens could be 
further limited by presidential declaration. Among the registrants, 
every male alien between specified ages residing in the United States 
was liable for service. Thus, the distinction between declarant and 
nondeclarant aliens was abandoned. Section 3(a) contained a proviso: 
" . . . that any citizen or subject of a neutral country shall 
be relieved from liability for training and service under this Act 
if, prior to induction into the land or naval forces, he has made 
application to be relieved from such liability in the manner pre-
scribed by and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed 
6 13 Stat. L. 732 (1863). 
7 30 Stat. L. 361 (1898). 
s40 Stat. L. 77 (1917). 
9 40 Stat. L. 885 (1918). 
10 Tutun v. United States, (1st Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 763 at 764. Aliens who claim 
the exemptions from service that are also open to citizens do not disqualify themselves for 
citizenship. Petition of Kohl, (2d Cir. 1945) 146 F. (2d) 347. 
11 54 Stat. L. 885 (1940). 
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by the President, but any person who makes such application 
shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United 
States."12 
The Selective Service System adopted Form DSS 301 as the applica-
tion under this section. 
IL Def ens es to the Citizenship Bar 
While the right of the United States under international law to 
require military service of aliens has sometimes been questioned, 13 
there is no doubt of the right of this country to impose conditions 
upon aspirants to citizenship, including military service while an alien 
is a resident.14 Thus, the cases arising from use of Form 301 have not 
been generally concerned with the legality of the citizenship bar ( with 
the exception of the cases involving treaty aliens, which will be noted 
later). Rather, conceding the validity of the provision, the alien 
typically argues that the special facts of his case avoid its effect as to 
him. Therefore, the cases will be grouped according to the defenses 
raised. 
A. Defense That Alien Was Not a Citizen of a "Neutral Coun-
try." Section 3(a) provided relief from military service only for a 
"citizen or subject of a neutral country."15 The Director of Selective 
Service defined a neutral country as one that was neither a co-
belligerent nor an enemy.16 It was the practice of the Director to give 
the local boards periodically a list of countries deemed neutral.17 In 
Petition of Ajlouny,18 the applicant maintained that signing Form 301 
could be no bar to citizenship because his country, Palestine, was in 
fact non-neutral. The court agreed, refusing to be bound by the 
determination of the Director of Selective Service. Palestine was ruled 
12 55 Stat. L. 844 (1941). In 1945, Congress amended 8 U.S.C. (1946) §224(c), 
defining those ineligible for citizenship, to include anyone barred under §3(a) of the 
Selective Service Act. 
13 The writers disagree whether the United States policy of drafting neutral aliens 
raises a problem in international law. For the view that the alien draft contravenes an 
established principle of the law of nations, see 28 VA. L. R:sv. 624 (1942). For the 
contrary view, see Fitzhugh and Hyde, "The Drafting of Neutral Aliens by the United 
States,'' 36 AM. J. INT. L. 369 (1942). 
14 In re Martinez, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 101. 
1s 55 Stat. L. 844 at 845 (1941). 
16 Selective Service Regulations, §601.2(c). This, and other administrative material 
dealing with aliens, can be found in U.S. Government, Selective Service System, Special 
Monograph, 3 PROBLEMS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE (Appendix B) 33 (1952). 
17 U.S. Government, Selective Service System, Special Monograph, 3 PROBLEMS OF 
SELECTIVE SERVICE (Appendix B) collects all such lists issued during World War II. 
1s (D.C. Mich. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 327. 
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by Great Britain under a mandate. Great Britain was at war and 
Palestine was geared to those efforts. It had been bombed. No 
significant change had taken place between November 1942, when 
petitioner signed Form 301, and December 1943, when Palestine was 
taken off the Director's list of neutral countries. Since Palestine was 
not neutral, the application for relief from service was a nullity and 
petitioner was not disqualified from citizenship.19 In Petition of 
Dweck,20 the petitioner alleged that Syria was not a neutral country 
at the time the application was made. This contention emphasized 
less the non-neutrality idea than the belief that Syria, through invasion 
and occupation by Britain and France, had ceased to be a state. The 
court refused to find a parallel with Ajlouny. While Palestine was 
in "pupilage," and thus followed Great Britain, Syria had been set up 
as an independent republic before petitioner's application in 1943. 
Having found this status as an independent nation, the court did not 
concern itself with belligerency-in-fact. Thus, while not condemning 
either the Ajlouny method or result, this court in purporting to use 
the method failed to ask all the questions. The decision implies that 
Ajlouny permits an investigation into the facts of neutrality only when 
a state is not free to make an independent determination of status. 
Syria being independent, the court is bound by her formal declaration 
of war. If an inquiry into the facts of neutrality is a correct approach, 
it should be equally correct for independent states as for subject ones. 
The recent case of In re Molo21 passes over Dweck and condemns the 
method of Ajlouny. While there are doubtless different degrees of 
neutrality, the court held that the Director's definition will be respected. 
A clear-cut test was needed by the Selective Service System for efficient 
operation. Congress was more concerned with getting men into uni-
form than in closely defining neutrality. Iran, the country in question 
here, was neutral until its declaration of war, despite treaties with 
Russia and Great Britain and a termination of diplomatic relations 
with the Axis before that time, and the presence of Allied troops and 
materiel. 
The Molo argument of administrative necessity is compelling. By 
contrast, the alien's argument is unappealing; having enjoyed defer-
ment as the national of a neutral country, he now seeks to escape 
the effect of that deferment. If he is successful in convincing the 
19 This decision closely follows that of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter 
of Mileikowsky, A-4443410 (1947), which also dealt with Palestine. See 5 IMM. & NAT. 
SERV. Mo. REv. 56 at 58 (1947). 
20 (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 106 F. Supp. 169. 
21 (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 137. 
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court of the non-neutrality of his homeland, he is admitting that he 
enjoyed, at least for a time, a deferment that he did not deserve. 
B. Defense of Exemption by Treaty. Prior to the enactment of 
the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, the United States had 
entered into treaties with some twenty countries, exempting their 
citizens from service in the armed forces of this country. These na-
tions contended that the treaties remained superior to the draft law, 
and insisted that their nationals be released from military service in 
the United States without incurring the citizenship bar. Over the 
objection of Selective Service Headquarters, the State Department 
agreed to issue a revised Form 301 for use by treaty aliens, which 
deleted the clause disqualifying the applicant from citizenship. The 
State Department specified, however, that the final determination of 
the alien's right to United States citizenship should be left to the 
naturalization courts.22 
A considerable amount of litigation has arisen concerning the use 
of these revised Forms 301, notably by Swiss nationals claiming under 
the Treaty of 1850.23 In three cases before the various administrative 
boards of the Immigration and Naturalization Service during 1947 it 
was held that neither the treaty nor the use of the revised Form 301 
served to absolve the alien from the citizenship disqualification. In 
Matter of Kutil24 the lower reviewing board, the Central Office, held 
the treaty repealed to the extent that it was inconsistent with the 
Selective Service Act. To petitioner's claim that he would not have 
signed Form 301 had he appreciated its effect, the board replied that 
it was sufficient to deny citizenship that he had put his own interests 
before those of the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals 
affirmed, while not agreeing that the draft law necessarily repealed the 
treaty provisions. In Matter of Lowe,25 the Board reached the same 
result, holding itself not bound by the opinion of the Department of 
State, pointing out that that body had left the final determination of 
the question to the naturalization courts, and finding the intention of 
Congress "to penalize all nationals of neutral countries having treaties 
22 U.S. Government, Selective Service System, Special Monograph, 1 PROBLEMS OF 
SELECTIVE SERVICE 115 (1952). The treaties are discussed in some detail in Fitzhugh 
and Hyde, ''The Drafting of Neutral Aliens by the United States." 36 AM.. J. INT. L. 
369 (1942). The content and use of the revised Form 301 is described in Moser v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 41, 71 S.Ct. 553 (1951). 
2311 Stat. L. 587 at 589 (1850): "The citizens of one of the two countries, residing 
or established in the other, shall be free from personal military service." 
24A-4197506, A-4257898, 2, I. & N. Dec. 858 (1947). 
2s 5878178, 2, I. & N. 914 (1947). 
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with the United States similar to the Swiss treaty who claimed exemp-
tion from military service."26 In Matter of W eissman21 the Central 
Office again held the inconsistent treaty provisions repealed by the 
later act of Congress, and that contrary assurances to the petitioner 
from the State Department and the Swiss Legation were of no avail. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court in 
Moser v. United States28 held that the bar to citizenship was not in-
consistent with the treaty provisions, since the treaty did not guarantee 
unconditional exemption from service. However, the Court believed 
that a petitioner in good faith who had been misled by the State De-
partment' s revised DSS 301 should not be held to have waived any 
right he may have had to apply for United States citizenship. This 
decision should save from the citizenship bar those treaty aliens who 
signed the revised form, but apparently an alien from a treaty nation 
will not be allowed to make a similar plea where he signed the un-
revised form, even if the consular officials representing his country 
advised him that he was protected under the treaty.29 Thus, the treaty 
itself has never been made the basis of relief from the effect of Form 
301. 
C. Defense of Mistake. It is clear that the alien will not be 
permitted to complain that he was mistaken or misled into signing 
Form 301 unless he furnishes a substantial basis for this claim. The 
local board is presumed to have discharged its duty in acquainting the 
alien with the significance of his act in seeking relief from military 
service.30 The applicant has a duty to ascertain the effect of this act.81 
If the court finds no fact basis for the claim of misunderstanding, or 
doubts the good faith of the applicant in making it, the defense fails.32 
As was stated above, the alien cannot rely upon the erroneous opinion 
of his country's consul that his rights to an unconditional release are 
guaranteed by treaty, unless this misunderstanding was compounded 
by the State Department in permitting the use of a revised Form 301 
in which the citizenship bar is deleted, as in the Moser case.33 Beyond 
20 Id. at 915. 
21 A-5113737, 2, I. & N. 899 (1947). 
2s 341 U.S. 41, 71 S.Ct. 553 (1951). 
29 Mannerfrid v. United States, (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 730; In re Martinez, 
(D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 101. 
30 Barreiro v. McGrath, (D.C. Cal. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 685. 
31 In re Martinez, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 101. 
32 Petition of Bartenbach, (D.C. Pa. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 649; In re Martinez, (D.C. 
Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 101; Mannerfrid v. United States, (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 
730; Barreiro v. McGrath, (D.C. Cal. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 685. 
as Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 71 S.Ct. 553 (1951). 
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Moser, the only case in which credence was given the claim of mistake 
was Machado v. McGrath.34 There, the petitioner set out his in-
complete mastery of the English language, the fact that he was advised 
to sign Form 301 by a clerk of his local board, that he signed without 
the form having been explained to him, and did so in the belief that 
it would secure him an exemption on the grounds of nonresidence 
rather than neutral alienage. The court of appeals held that this 
stated a cause of action on mistake grounds, within the Moser rule. 
A right as important as citizenship should not be waived without there 
having been an opportunity for intelligent consideration of the alterna-
tives. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.35 Thus, the essential 
elements of a mistake defense seem to be the participation of the 
government or one of its officials in misleading the applicant,36 coupled 
with a reasonable belief by the alien, considering his ability to under-
stand the situation, that he does not waive his rights to apply for 
citizenship. 
D. Defense of Nonresidence. Section 2 of the original 1940 
draft law provided for registration of male citizens and "every male 
alien residing in the United States."37 The attorney general was 
called upon to interpret this section, and denned residence very 
broadly to include " ... every alien ... who lives or has a place 
of residence or abode in the United States, temporary or otherwise, or 
for whatever purpose taken or established. . . ."38 When amend-
ment to the 1940 act permitted the drafting of nondeclarant aliens, 
the Director of Selective Service, under his delegated power to make 
exceptions, promulgated Regulation 611.13,39 stating which non-
declarants would be held nonresidents of the United States. For 
present purposes, the important exceptions were ( 1) those aliens who 
did not remain in the United States for more than three months, and 
34 (D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 706. 
35 342 U.S. 948, 72 S.Ct. 557 (1952). 
36 In Mannerfrid v. United States, (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 730, the court char-
acterized the mistake in the Moser case as caused by a third person, the consul. However, 
it would seem that the Supreme Court held the participation of the 'Department of State 
in the mistake an essential condition of relief: ''In response to claims of petitioner and 
others, and in apparent acquiescence, our Department of State had arranged for a revised 
procedure in claiming exemption. The express waiver of citizenship had been deleted. 
Petitioner had sought information and guidance from the highest authority to which he 
could turn. . • • He was led to believe that he would not lose his rights to citizenship." 
Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 at 46, 71 S.Ct. 553 (1951). 
37 54 Stat. L. 885 (1940). 
38 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 504 (1940). 
39 U.S. Government, Selective Service System, Special Monograph, 3 PROBLEMS OF 
SELEcnvE SEnvrcE 34 (1952). 
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(2) those who, upon proper application for determination of status, 
were determined to be nonresidents. Also, Regulation 611.2140 re-
quired an alien who wished to be determined a nonresident to do so 
within three months. Later, this was supplanted by Regulation 
611.21-1,41 allowing determination of residence after the three-month 
period. 
A number of aliens who signed Form 30 l have argued that this 
act was a nullity because, being nonresidents, they were not liable 
for military service. These complaints have chieB.y come from aliens 
who were in the United States on a temporary visa at the outbreak 
of war, and who were forced to apply for successive extensions because 
of inability to return home. In Benzian v. Godwin,42 such an alien 
was denied the right to have his status as a nonresident determined 
because he did not apply within three months as was then required. 
To avoid military service he signed Form 30 l. When the regulation 
was changed to permit determination of residence after three months, 
petitioner applied again and was found to be a resident by his local 
board and the Director. In an action seeking a declaratory judgment 
of the alien's status as a nonresident, the court held that Congress had 
adopted the very broad definition of residence offered by the attorney 
general when it amended the draft law. Therefore, petitioner could 
escape service only if he came under one of the exceptions in Regu-
lation 611.13 or if he signed Form 30 l. Since the Director had deter-
mined that the alien's case did not fall within a regulatory exception 
(a determination which the court was unwilling to find had no basis 
of fact), the alien was bound by Form 301 and subject to the citizenship 
bar. The Supreme Court in McGrath v. Kristensen43 obviously dis-
approved of a definition of residence for the purposes of the Selective 
Service Act which included these temporary visitors. In this case the 
alien had signed Form 301 before May 16, 1942, after which ti.me 
the regulations would have declared him a resident. Before this date, 
the Court held, the regulations either declared petitioner a nonresident 
or were nondeclarati.ve of status. If they were nondeclarati.ve, it was 
necessary to inquire into the breadth of the term "resident" in the act. 
The Court thought the act was not intended to include ". . . a so-
journ within our borders made necessary by the conditions of the 
ti.mes. . . ."44 Since the alien was a nonresident, his execution of 
40Jd. at 36. 
41Id. at 37. 
42 (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 952. 
43 340 U.S. 162, 71 S.Ct. 224 (1950). 
44 Id. at 176. 
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Form 30 I did not result in disability for citizenship. Justice Jackson, 
the attorney general who had rendered the opinion which defined 
residence broadly, delivered a concurring opinion in which he com-
pletely renounced the view he had once held. This decision offers 
protection to aliens whose claim of nonresidence relates to a period 
not covered by the regulations, but the Court did not pretend to in-
validate the m_ore strict rules of residence found within the regulations. 
That the regulations where applicable will govern the case was made 
clear in Mannerfrid 11. United States45 and the Machado case.46 The 
former action involved a determination of nonresidence under the 
regulations, while the latter illustrates the operation of the three-month 
rule. 
Since an application by an alien under the regulations to have his 
· status as a nonresident determined was undoubtedly considered in 
light of the attorney general's interpretation of the act, a court would 
be justified in holding that the tests used have been repudiated by 
Kristensen. However, the Second Circuit refused to so hold in the 
recent Mannerfrid decision. While there is understandable reluctance 
to reopen the Director's decisions on nonresidence, finding that one 
who remained involuntarily in the United States was resident here 
seems unduly harsh when the citizenship bar of Form 301 is con-
sidered. 
E. Miscellaneous Defenses. Several of the defenses that have 
been offered can be dealt with in summary fashion. The fact that a 
country neutral when the alien signed Form 30 I subsequently became 
belligerent, rendering the alien liable to military service, does not end 
the citizenship bar.47 However, if the alien thereafter actually served 
in the armed forces, he may become a citizen despite the presence of 
Form 301 in his file.48 Similarly, volunteering for military service 
after signing Form 30 I does not wipe away the citizenship disability 
unless actual service follows.49 The fact that the alien ultimately 
45 (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 730. 
46 Machado v. McGrath, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 706. 
47 Petition of Fatoullah, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 499; Machado v. McGrath, 
(D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 706; In re Molo, (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 137. The 
Director of Selective Service held the opposite view. See Matter of Josefsson, A-4558054, 
2, I. & N. 545 (1947). 
48 Matter of Weissman, A-5113737, 2, I. & N. 899 (1947). This follows the view 
of the courts under the similar provision of the World War I act. In re Gustavson, (D.C. 
Cal. 1924) 300 F. 251. See 5 IMM. & NAT. SEav. Mo. REv. 56 at 59 (1947). 
49 In re Martinez, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 101. There is some ambiguous 
language in Barreiro v. McGrath, (D.C. Cal. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 685, which could be 
read to say that the mere act of volunteering (by signing Form 165), would lift the citi-
zenship bar, but it does not appear likely that the court intended anything less than actual 
service to suffice. 
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proves unacceptable to the armed forces because of age or physical 
condition will not help him if he claimed. exemption as a neutral alien 
while potentially draft eligible.5° Finally, it is obvious that the citizen-
ship bar survived. the expiration of the Selective Service Act. 51 
III. Conclusions 
The United States is clearly within its rights in imposing a con-
dition of military service upon those aliens who aspire to citizenship. 
Further, the use of willingness-to-serve as a screening process for 
would-be citizens expresses a sound policy; aliens who feel that they 
have an insufficient stake in the United States to join in its defense 
are free to avoid taking part, but in so doing they set themselves outside 
that group from which we wish to draw future citizens. Unfortunately, 
this generally desirable rule may work undue hardship in particular 
cases. It is doubtless true that individual rights were secondary to the 
necessities of the war effort, but at war's end a reconsideration of 
hastily made decisions was in order. Ordinarily, one would propose 
legislative relief for hardship cases, but with the termination of the 
alien draft in its World War II form, the legislative branch is likely 
to regard the problem as closed.52 As a result, aliens with appealing 
cases find themselves cut off from legislative relief--a group whose 
status is determined by the actions of a critical period. · As such, the 
relief which they may get seems almost wholly confined to the courts, 
which can mitigate only to a limited extent the effect of statutes and 
regulations. However, the best defenses available to an alien put him 
outside the operation of Form 301, because he was never subject to 
its terms or because he was misled, and in these areas the courts may 
act. Finally, let it be noted that the courts exhibit marked individual 
differences on the question of the seriousness of attempting to escape 
military duty. A court that believes in serving without objection when 
50 Petition of Perez, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 591. Ironically, most of the 
Form 301 cases involve aliens who were physically disqualified for service and thus could 
have escaped the draft without incurring the citizenship bar. Their healthier brothers 
entered the service when their countries subsequently became belligerent, as most did, 
and thus purged themselves of the Form 301 disability. 
51 Mannerfrid v. United States, (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 730; Benzian v. 
Godwin, (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 952; Machado v. McGrath, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F. 
(2d) 706. 
52 A private bill seeking to avoid the effect of Form 301 in a single case was vetoed. 
See 5 IMM. & NAT. SERV. Mo. REv. 31 (1947). The present draft law, the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. L. 604 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. V, 
1952) §454, specifies military liability for every male alien admitted to permanent residence. 
Other aliens are liable if they reside in the United States for more than one year, but such 
aliens can ask to be relieved from service on penalty of being debarred from becoming 
citizens. 
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one is called as the sine qua non of loyalty to the principles of the 
United States is likely to overlook some of the possible defenses to the 
citizenship bar.58 
John Houck, S.Ed. 
53 Compare In re Martinez, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 101, with Moser v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 41, 71 S.Ct. 553 (1951). 
